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Richard Garrison was represented by a lawyer who, on
the second day of jury selection, was arrested on his way to
the courthouse with a .27 blood alcohol content.1
Jack House was represented by a lawyer who did not in-
vestigate the crime, failed to file any pre-trial motions, and
did not attempt to obtain discovery from the prosecutor.
Three days before trial, the lawyer asked her husband to take
charge of the case because she felt ill-prepared to handle it.
Neither attorney was aware there was a separate sentencing
hearing following a conviction of guilt so they prepared no ev-
idence and no argument for the jury on the question of
punishment.2
The lawyers for Marion Pruett were paid a total of
$1000.00 each in fees for the investigation and trial of his
capital case. Over 100 pre-trial motions were filed and liti-
gated in pre-trial proceedings that lasted over nine days.
The actual trial took more than four weeks. Based upon the
hours documented by the lawyers, the fee represented $2.22
per hour for one lawyer and $2.07 for the other-far less than
the minimum wage for the state. Although both counsel were
from out-of-state, they were not reimbursed for their costs of
lodging, meals and phone calls during the course of the trial.
3
These examples highlight many of the problems that ex-
ist in the legal representation provided to indigent persons
facing capital sentencing. Defense lawyers in capital cases
* Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara Law School, B.A. 1974; Univer-
sity of Pennsylavania, J.D., 1977 George Washington University. For their
helpful comments on this essay, I thank June Carbone, Jonathan Bush, and
Cookie Ridolfi. Most of all, I thank Tom Hoglund for his encouragement and
support.
1. People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419 (Cal. 1989).
2. House v. Balckom, 725 F.2d 608 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874
(1984).
3. Pruett v. State, 574 So. 2d 1342, 1349 (Miss. 1990).
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are often untrained and inexperienced.4 All too frequently
they lack the resources necessary to properly investigate, pre-
pare and present an effective defense. At times they are
even shamefully incompetent. Death "is different both in its
severity and its finality,"' and its imposition demands "a cor-
responding... need for reliability."6 A careful review of capi-
tal cases shows that this has not happened. The actual rec-
ord is troubling. There is no rational way to distinguish "the
few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the
many cases in which it is not."7
This article examines the failure of our system of justice
to impose the death penalty in a manner that is consistent
with the constitutional requirements set out by the Supreme
Court. I argue that much of the blame for this failure rests
with the Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington.'
Strickland both ignored precedents affirming the special na-
ture of capital cases ("death is different"), and hindered the
assurance of effective legal representation.
The Court's historical adherence to the notion that
"death is different"9 is reviewed below, in part II, along with
the special procedural requirements that the Court has es-
tablished for capital cases. These requirements are markedly
4. Ira Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Reviewing
State Death Penalty Cases, 1990 A.BA. CRIM. JUST. SEc.-Task Force on Death
Penalty Habeas Corpus; Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon:
Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. AND SOC. CHANGE 245
(1990-91).
5. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977).
6. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
7. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976). In Gregg, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of Georgia's death penalty scheme. In its
analysis the Court made clear that any sentence of death "could not be imposed
under a sentencing procedure that created a substantial risk that it would be
imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner". Id.
8. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
9. Pruett v. State, 574 So.2d 1342, 1344 (Miss. 1990). Throughout the cap-
ital jurisprudence since Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), every Supreme
Court Justice has insisted or at least endorsed the notion that death penalty is
different. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984)(Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)("In the 12 years since Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), every member of this Court has
written or joined at least one opinion endorsing the proposition that because of
the severity and irrevocability, the death penalty is qualitatively different from




different than those followed in other criminal trials,1" and
include "individualized sentencing," which demands that an
individual's background be considered before a sentence of
death can be imposed.1" I discuss how this constitutional re-
quirement is fulfilled only when counsel is allotted adequate
resources, including both time and money, to perform a thor-
ough investigation and, present mitigating evidence at trial.
Part III reviews the law that guarantees an indigent per-
son the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel
and examines the historical record of its application. The
question, essentially, is how well have lawyers represented
indigent capital defendants since capital punishment was re-
instated over two decades ago. Although the complex nature
of capital litigation calls for defense attorneys with special-
ized skills, untrained lawyers have often been appointed. In-
experience, insufficient funding, and ineptitude too fre-
quently contribute to ineffective counseling. The selection of
who will live and who will die, thus appears to depend more
on the performance of counsel than on the particular nature
of the offender's crime. 12
The judicial and the legislative response to the mandate
to provide counsel in capital cases has failed to distinguish
the special needs inherent in capital case litigation. There-
fore, in Part IV, I propose judicial and legislative solutions to
ensure effective representation. The courts must review
claims of effective assistance of counsel in capital cases differ-
ently from other criminal cases. Either a higher standard of
performance must be imposed on counsel in the penalty trial
of a capital case, or a presumption of ineffectiveness should
be made when counsel neglects to thoroughly investigate and
seek out mitigating evidence.
The state legislatures must enact guidelines for the ap-
pointment of counsel in a way that ensures effective repre-
sentation. In addition, each state should provide counsel
with adequate resources to effectively prepare and present a
capital defense.
10. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198 (providing an important procedural safeguard of
an automatic appeal of all death sentences).
11. Id. at 199; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978) (holding that the
decision to impose death must focus on the circumstances of the crime and the
individual defendant).
12. Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1841 (1994).
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II. CAPITAL CASES ARE DIFFERENT
A. Death Is Different
Since 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,'3 the Supreme Court
has endorsed the notion that "death is different". This refers
to the unique nature of the penalty of death: its severity, its
finality, and its irrevocability.' 4 The Supreme Court has
cited this "qualitative" difference of the penalty of death as
the basis for imposing additional procedural safeguards on
capital trials that do not apply to other criminal cases.15
These protections are designed to ensure that any sentence of
death is imposed in a fair and non-arbitrary manner.
Capital cases involve a bifurcated proceeding that is re-
ally akin to two separate trials: the first addresses the ques-
tion of guilt, the second addresses the question of a penalty.16
The penalty trial is unlike a sentencing hearing which occurs
in other criminal cases; it is a trial unto itself, with many of
the constitutional protections that apply to a trial addressing
the question of guilt or innocence. 17 The penalty trial is fun-
damentally different from other criminal trials, however, be-
cause it is centered on the background and life of the defend-
ant, rather than the circumstances of the crime."8
13. 408 U.S. 363 (1972).
14. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (noting that death as a punish-
ment is unique in its severity and irrevocability).
15. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,
87 (1985).
16. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 191-92, 195. The court cited the Model Penal Code
and stated that "the obvious solution [to ensuring a fair determination of the
question of guilt separate from the question of penalty] is to bifurcate the pro-
ceeding." Id. at 191.
The court concluded by stating:
In summary, the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of
death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met
by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing author-
ity is given adequate information and guidance. As a general proposi-
tion these concerns are best met by a system that provides for a bifur-
cated proceeding.
Id. at 195. Bullington v.Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981) (holding that be-
cause the sentencing proceeding was like a trial on the question of guilt or
innocence, the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy clause to one acquit-
ted by a jury is also available to him with respect to the death penalty.)
17. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 446.
18. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602-04 (1978).
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B. Litigation is Different
Capital defense litigation is more complex, and must be
handled differently than other criminal cases. Both the guilt
and penalty trials are presented to the same jury: often one
right after the other. 19 From the outset of the case, defense
counsel needs to devise a common theme or strategy that ef-
fectively links the guilt and penalty phases. Counsel's chal-
lenge is to maintain credibility with jurors during the penalty
trial, even after a guilty verdict is returned in the guilt trial.
In the beginning of the guilt trial, the defendant is af-
forded the presumption of innocence, and the jury is in-
structed not to look to the defendant to produce any evidence.
The law is clear that the burden of proof rests solely with the
prosecution-to demonstrate guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.2 °
The sentencing trial begins only after the jury has re-
turned a verdict of guilty on first degree murder. The defense
must then convince the same jurors that imposing a lengthy
prison sentence is more justifiable than sentencing the de-
fendant to death. As a practical necessity, defense counsel
must "present the case for life" in order to forestall the jury
from imposing a sentence of death. To present little or no evi-
dence invites the jury to impose death.2 1
The two trials constituting a capital case increase the de-
mands placed on defense counsel. 22 Ideally, a defense "team"
19. The case of David Peek in Georgia is perhaps the most extreme example
of how closely the penalty phase follows a conviction of guilt. Mr. Peak's trial
began at nine o'clock in the morning. He was convicted by the jury at midnight
the same night. The judge denied the defense request for a recess and immedi-
ately began the penalty phase of the trial. A death verdict was returned by 1:30
the same morning. Telephone Interview with Patsy Morris, Georgia Resource
Center (July 1994) (discussing Peek v. Georgia, 238 S.E.2d 12 (Ga. 1977)).
20. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
21. 1 CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY MANuAL 19 (Michael N. Burt ed., 1993).
Typically the task of defense counsel will be to seize the initiative from
the prosecution and shift the focus of sympathetic attention from the
victim to the defendant by presentation of a lengthy, detailed, personal
and sympathetic life history of the client-testimony supplemented by
institutional documentation, personal memorabilia, and other demon-
strative evidence with the overview perspective of a psychologist and
or mitigation specialist who explains the factual foundation in plain
language.
Id.
22. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981) (providing for the penalty
trial to maintain the hallmarks and protections of the guilt trial).
1995] 489
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is created that works together to prepare and present the
best possible "case for life". The team should include a mini-
mum of two lawyers.2 3 In addition, the team should include a
"mitigation" specialist (usually a psychologist or social
worker) to direct the gathering of information for the penalty
phase2 4 and several investigators to trace people and infor-
mation, and obtain the documentation necessary to reveal
and substantiate the complex underworking of an individ-
ual's life. Typically, the team also needs a mental health ex-
pert (or experts) to conduct psychological testing and to help
prepare or explain biographical information to jurors. Opti-
mally, the complete team should be assembled when the case
first begins, so that everyone can work together to present a
complete and coherent defense at both trials.
The penalty trial is, in short, a trial for life and about life.
It is a trial for life in the sense that the defendant's life is at
stake. It is a trial about life, because the central issue is the
meaning and value of the defendant's life.25
C. Sentencing is Different
The Supreme Court has mandated that before someone
may be sentenced to death, the jury2 6 must consider the life
and background of the individual charged.27 This constitu-
tional requirement of "individualized sentencing" addresses
two fundamental concerns: the need to provide the jury with
adequate information before they impose any sentence of
death, and the need to ensure that the basic humanity of the
individual against whom the death penalty is sought is not
completely ignored. As Justice Mosk observed, "It follows
that in a capital case the fundamental respect for humanity
underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of
23. CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY MANUAL, supra note 22, at 14; TOWARD A
MORE JUST AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF REVIEW iN STATE DEATH PENALTY CASES
9 app. B-20, (Ira Robbins ed., 1990).
24. Gary Goodpaster, The Trial For Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 324 (1983); Welsh White, Effective
Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care, 2 U.
ILL. L. REv. 323 (1993). The nature of penalty phase litigation requires some-
one other than lawyer. Id.
25. Goodpaster, supra note 25, at 303.
26. Although in three jurisdictions, the judge makes the determination as
to the question of penalty, I will refer to the factfinder as the "jury."




the character and record of the individual offender and the
circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of
death. 2 s
Modem death penalty statutes have evolved since 1972,
when the Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia, struck
down all then existing death penalty statutes as unconstitu-
tional.29 The Court found that the existing statutes permit-
ted juries to exercise "unguided and unrestrained" discretion
in the imposition of death. The Court held that this process
resulted in the infliction of sentences of death in a wholly ar-
bitrary and capricious manner; that the randomness of the
process made it "cruel and unusual" in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.3 °
Legislatures around the country quickly drafted new
death penalty statutes designed to survive the rule laid down
in Furman. In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed five of
these statutes and, in a series of cases, set forth standards for
the permissible imposition of the sentence of death.31 The re-
28. In re Jackson, 835 P.2d 371, 432 (Cal. 1992) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis added) (citations omitted). Justice Mosk explained how the recognition
of the individual was an indispensible part of the Eighth Amendment protec-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment:
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less
than the dignity of man.... To impose a sentence of death ignorant of
"the defendant's character, background, [and] history is to deny that
dignity and treat the defendant as something less than a human be-
ing: 'A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the
character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of
the particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ulti-
mate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigat-
ing factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats
all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual
human beings, but as members of a faceless undifferentiated mass to
be subjected to the "blind infliction of the penalty of death."
Id. (citations omitted)
29. 408 U.S. 238, 238 (1972).
30. Id. at 257 (5-4 decision) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., plurality opinion,);
Id. at 291-92 (Brennan, J., concurring). These discretionary statutes are uncon-
stitutional in their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and dis-
crimination is an ingredient incompatible with the idea of equal protection of
the law that is implicit in the ban on cruel and unusual punishments. There
was no opinion by the court. The 5-4 decision was announced in a per curiam
statement followed by separate opinions.
31. In each of the cases decided in 1976 the court approved three that pro-
vided for the "guided discretion" approach in the sentencing hearing. Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). Two of the statutes that imposed mandatory death
1995]
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quirement that any sentence of death reflect an "individual-
ized determination" was of paramount concern. The Court
held that to prevent the risk of the arbitrary infliction of the
death sentence, the jury must be provided sufficient informa-
tion on the background of the defendant, and adequate gui-
dance on how to evaluate said information.32 Consistent with
this view, the Court struck down those death penalty statutes
that imposed a mandatory capital sentence upon conviction of
capital murder,3 3 and upheld the statutes that provided for
individualized consideration of each defendant.
The Court has, thus far, refused to depart from the doc-
trine of individual sentencing in any capital case. As recent
as 1987, the Court struck down a Nevada statute which im-
posed a mandatory death sentence for anyone convicted of
committing a capital murder while serving a sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 4 Even in
this narrowly defined circumstance, the Court concluded that
a departure from the notion of individualized sentencing "is
not justified and could not be reconciled with the demands of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments".35 In another case,
the Court stated, "the non-availability of corrective or modify-
ing mechanisms with respect to an executed capital sentence
underscores the need for individualized consideration as a
constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence.""
sentences were struck down. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
32. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 192-93.
33. Woodson, 428 U.S. 280.
34. Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 66 (1987). Under the Nevada statute,
a mandatory death sentence was imposed where an inmate, while serving a
sentence of life without the possibility of parole is convicted of capital murder.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030 (1957).
35. Sumner, 483 U.S. at 78.
36. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (emphasis added). The Court
went on to explain:
We recognize that, in non-capital cases, the established practice of in-
dividualized sentences rests not on constitutional commands but on
public policy enacted into statutes .... Given that the imposition of
death by public authority is so profoundly different from all other pen-
alties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that an individualized decision is
essential in capital cases. The need for treating each defendant in a
capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the indi-
vidual is far more important than in noncapital cases. A variety of
flexible techniques-probation, parole, work furloughs to name a
few-and various post conviction remedies may be available to modify
an initial sentence of confinement in noncapital cases.
(Vol. 35492
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D. Representation is Different
If the Supreme Court mandate for individualized sen-
tencing in a capital case is to have any meaning, the Court
must impose a duty on the part of counsel to investigate and
assemble all possible evidence about a defendant's life.3 7
The mandate for individualized sentencing requires not
only a duty to investigate the background of a defendant, but
also a responsibility to present any relevant evidence on this
issue to the jury in order to "make the case for life".38 There
is no doubt that a jury will receive ample information con-
cerning the circumstances of the crime-the prosecution en-
sures that. It is only during the penalty phase of the trial,
however, that a jury can learn about the individual who com-
mitted the offense.
As a practical matter, the importance of presenting miti-
gating evidence to a jury during the penalty trial cannot be
overstated. Without access to a chronology of the defendant's
life in a coherent and persuasive fashion, the jury is left with
only the horror of the crime and information about the de-
fendant that the prosecution has chosen to introduce. This
hardly provides the jury with an opportunity to fairly evalu-
Id. at 604-05.
37. Mitchell v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 1026, 1031 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari). Justice Marshall stated that:
The reliability of the process depends upon the sentencer's considera-
tion of both tangibles and intangibles... in evaluating the individual
character of the defendant and his acts. In light of the importance that
this Court has placed upon the role of mitigating evidence in capital
sentencing decisions, I cannot believe that Strickland was intended to
permit a defendant to be sentenced to death solely on the basis of the
State's evidence, when a powerful defense could easily have been mar-
shalled on his behalf. Any reasonable standard of professionalism gov-
erning the conduct of a capital defense must impose upon the attorney,
at a minimum, the obligation to explore aspects of his client's character
that might persuade the sentencer to spare his life. Without even this
effort, the adversarial process breaks down.
Id. (citations omitted).
38. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 104 (1981). In Eddings, the Court
stated:
Just as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from
considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to
consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence.
We note that [any] death penalty statute permits the defendant to
present evidence "as to any mitigating circumstances". . . . Lockett re-
quires the sentencer to listen.
Id. at 114-15 n.10.
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ate the life of the defendant in deciding whether he should be
permitted to live.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the constitu-
tional right of the defense to present mitigating evidence and
has reversed sentences of death where the trial court ex-
cluded mitigating evidence that was offered,8 9 even where the
evidence would have been excluded pursuant to the state's
evidentiary rules.4" The scope of mitigating evidence admis-
sible at trial is broad, and includes any evidence that could be
considered even "potentially mitigating".4 ' Justice Scalia,
writing for a unanimous Court, confirmed this proposition by
stating "w]e have held that in capital cases 'the sentencer'
may not refuse to consider or 'be precluded from considering'
any relevant mitigating evidence."42
39. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986). The Court reversed the
decision of the state trial court to exclude the testimony of jailers and a visitor
who would have attested to the defendant's good adjustment while incarcer-
ated. The Court found that this evidence was clearly mitigating in the "sense
that they might serve 'as a basis for a sentence less than death.'" Id. at 4-5.
See also Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05. The Court stated:
we conclude that the Eighth, and Fourteenth amendments require
that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a de-
fendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the of-
fense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death.
Id. at 604 (emphasis added).
40. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979). The Court held that it was
error to exclude testimony at the penalty phase of a trial even where the testi-
mony was hearsay and not admissible under the Georgia rules of evidence. Id.
The court stated "Ir]egardless of whether the proffered testimony comes within
Georgia's hearsay rule, under the facts of this case its exclusion constituted a
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The ex-
cluded testimony was highly relevant to a critical issue in the punishment
phase of the trial." Id.
See also Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1987). In Dutton, the
federal court reversed a sentence of death when the trial court did not permit
the defendant's mother to testify at the penalty phase of the trial because she
was present during the testimony of the guilt phase in violation of the state's
sequestration rule. Id. The court recognized the importance and validity of a
sequestration rule, but made it clear that this could not provide a basis to ex-
clude relevant mitigating evidence from the jury during the penalty phase of
the trial. See id. at 601-02.
41. Skipper, 416 U.S. at 5. "[E]vidence that the defendant would not pose a
danger if spared (but incarcerated) must be considered potentially mitigating.
Under Eddings, such evidence may not be excluded from the sentencer's consid-
eration." Id.
42. Id. at 4.
[Vol. 35
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The use of experts-primarily mental health experts-is
also an essential part of the preparation of a capital case.
Counsel needs the assistance of mental health experts to test
and evaluate defendants as well as to explore their childhood
and adolescence. Many persons charged with capital crimes
suffered extreme violence as children, and those experiences,
and their impact must be explored.43 Defense counsel are
usually ill-equipped to explore this information on their own,
underscoring the need for experts. Such information is essen-
tial in building an effective defense. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged the constitutional right of the defendant to
have access to expert assistance during the trial, and has rec-
ognized the critical role that an expert witness can play.
44
The jury in a capital case is instructed to consider the
background and life of the defendant. In order to effectively
present this information, counsel must prepare a complete so-
cial history of the defendant45 by engaging in a comprehen-
sive investigation dissimilar to routine investigative efforts
used in non-capital criminal cases. The time and resources
required for a thorough investigation are tremendous. Coun-
sel must interview all members of the extended family as
well as neighbors, friends and associates. Investigators must
explore personal and sensitive issues that many are reluctant
to discuss. As the defendants life begins to unfold, counsel
must discover and follow any "paper trail," learning not only
where the defendant has been, but reviewing all documents
along the way. Counsel cannot begin to evaluate the impor-
tance of this evidence until the investigation is complete and
the entire life unfolds.
Effective assistance of counsel in a capital case requires a
lawyer who has the requisite experience and skills to manage
a thorough investigation, and to properly prepare and pres-
ent the "case for life." Unless this is done, the jury has no
choice but to return a verdict of death.46
43. CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY MANUAL, supra note 22, at 381-82; Craig
Haney, Social Histories and Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. (forthcoming
1995) (manuscript at 14, on file with author).
44. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
45. See, e.g., Goodpaster, supra note 25, at 321; White, supra note 25, at
340. See also Berger, supra note 4, at 250.
46. See Mitchell v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 1026 (1987) (denial of certiorari) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See, e.g., White, supra note 25, at 341.
4951995]
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E. Summary
In order to make the "case for life", counsel in capital
cases must undertake an in-depth investigation into the life
and background of the defendant. This is mandated by the
requirement of individualized sentencing-the requirement
that the jury review the defendant's entire life, family, work,
and background to determine whether a sentence of life or
death is appropriate. In the penalty phase, this ultimate de-
cision of life or death is, by its very nature, a completely sub-
jective determination left to the evaluation of each individual
juror.
This investigative review is no small undertaking and re-
quires a lawyer with specialized skills in the handling of a
complex case as well as access to adequate resources to con-
duct the comprehensive investigation that is required. The
penalty trial gives the defense an opportunity to present the
life and background of the defendant in such a way that he
becomes real to the jurors: as a father, a brother, a victim of
child-abuse, rather than a faceless monster guilty of a horri-
ble crime. The penalty trial proceeding may be the last op-
portunity that the defense has to humanize the defendant
and appeal to the humanity of the jury to spare the life of a
fellow human being.
III. EFFECTIVE COUNSEL
A. Constitutional Right to Effective Counsel
One of the hallmarks of our modern American system of
justice is the constitutional right to counsel; the right of every
person to have a lawyer represent them in a criminal pro-
ceeding.4 7 Over 60 years ago the U. S. Supreme Court af-
firmed the importance of counsel to a criminal defendant
stating that the defendant "requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step of the proceedings against him. Without
it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction
because he does not know how to establish his innocence." 4s
47. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right... to have the assistance of counsel." McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 771. n.14 (1970). See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
339 (1963).




Initially, this right was limited to persons charged in
capital cases. 4 9 Then in 1963, in Gideon v. Wainwright,50 the
Warren Court5 ' decided that even in a simple burglary
charge, a case with few witnesses, no scientific evidence, and
only a few facts in dispute, counsel was necessary to ensure
that the process was fair.52 Gideon is still hailed as establish-
ing the "noble ideal" of insuring that "every defendant stands
equal before the law,"5 3 as the court unanimously extended
the right to counsel to include the right of all indigent defend-
ants, in capital and non-capital felony cases, to have counsel
appointed. On re-trial, Mr. Gideon was provided counsel and
was subsequently acquitted of all charges. 4
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.... Left without the aid
of counsel, [the defendant] may be put on trial without a proper
charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrele-
vant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. [The defendant] lacks both
the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even
though he may have a perfect one.
Id.
49. Although Powell did not specifically limit the appointment of counsel to
capital cases for many years it was applied in that way.
50. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
51. While many of this court's criminal law decisions have been criticized,
limited, or reversed over the years, this decision has retained its force and
respect.
52. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 148 (1968).
53. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. The Court in Gideon stated:
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor
to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is pro-
vided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments,
both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to es-
tablish machinery to try defendants accused of crime.... The right of
one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental
and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the
very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have
laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards
designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every
defendant stands equal before law. This noble ideal cannot be realized
if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a
lawyer to assist him.
Id. at 344.
See also Anthony Lewis, A Muted Trumpet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1988, at
A31. Former Attorney General Ed Meese, whose tenure as Attorney General is
largely associated with efforts to cut back on the rights of criminal defendants,
approves of this decision and was quoted as saying "representation by counsel
in all criminal cases is essential to the fair and effective administration of jus-
tice." Id.
54. LEWIS, supra note 52, at 37.
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Although the decision in Gideon did not provide specifi-
cally for effective counsel, a few years later the Court made
clear that effective counsel was necessary in criminal pro-
ceedings.55 For almost twenty years, the Supreme Court de-
clined to establish the criteria for effective counsel, and pro-
vided no single test to review the performance of counsel.
The Court left this task to the discretion of the trial courts
who were told simply to "strive to maintain proper standards
of performance by attorneys who are representing [criminal]
defendants."5 6
In the two decades that followed Gideon, federal circuit
courts established various standards to measure the perform-
ance of counsel. By the end of the 1970's, eleven of the twelve
federal circuits applied essentially the same standard, a test
of "reasonableness" to review the effectiveness of
representation.5
7
55. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1969). In McMann, the
Court upheld the defendant's guilty plea deciding that since it was based upon
"reasonably competent advice" of counsel it was "not open to attack". Id. at
770. The Court discussed, in dicta, that the right to counsel is the right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel, and that "defendants cannot be left to the mercies of
incompetent counsel." Id. at 771.
56. Id. at 771.
57. Only the second circuit continued to apply the test that the representa-
tion must be such as "to make the trial a farce or a mockery ofjustice.., and to
shock the conscience of the court". United States v. Wright, 176 F.2d 376, 379
(2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950). See also United States v.
Helgessen, 669 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1982). This test was criticized even within
the Second Circuit's own panel. See Indiviglio v. United States, 612 F.2d 628,
632 (2d Cir. 1979) (Mansfield, J., concurring).
The D.C. Circuit comes closest to the "farce and mockery standard by re-
quiring the defendant to show a "substantial breach" or "serious incompetency."
United States v. Wood, 628 F.2d 554, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(interpreting United
States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 994 (1979)).
The Seventh Circuit frames the test as representation "which meets the
minimum standard of professional representation." United States v. Zylastra,
713 F.2d 1332, 1338 (7th Cir. 1983).
Six Circuits have adopted the "reasonably competent assistance" standard.
United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1121 (1st Cir. 1978) ("reasonably compe-
tent assistance . . . within the range of competence expected of attorneys in
criminal cases."); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970)
("customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and
place"); Marzullo v. Md., 561 F.2d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S.
1011 (1978) (within the range of competency normally expected of attorneys
practicing criminal law); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1210 (8th Cir. 1982)
(the degree of skill and diligence with which a competent attorney would per-
form under similar circumstances); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1978) ("reasonably competentand effective
representation"); and United States v. Crouthers, 669 F.2d 635, 643 (10th Cir.
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Finally, in 1984, the Supreme Court took the case of
Strickland v. Washington,5" a capital case in which the de-
fendant claimed that his lawyer was ineffective in the prepa-
ration and presentation of the penalty phase of his trial.
In Strickland, the Supreme Court was presented with
the issue of how to evaluate the performance of counsel in a
criminal case. 59 The Court in Strickland had the opportunity
to ensure that indigent defendants would receive competent
counsel, and be protected from the incompetent lawyers who
plague the system. Regrettably, the Court declined to take
that step.60 Although the Court in Strickland went to great
lengths to reaffirm the importance of effective counsel at
trial, echoing the sentiments raised in Powell and Gideon
years earlier, 1 the test set by the court created a difficult and
almost insurmountable hurdle for a defendant to demon-
strate ineffectiveness on appeal.
The Court in Strickland established a two-pronged test,
addressing performance and prejudice, for determining when
the assistance of counsel is so defective that it warrants re-
1982) ("the skill, judgement, and diligence of a reasonably competent defense
attorney").
Three circuits have adopted a variation of the "reasonably competent" test
which provides that "counsel [was] reasonably likely to render... reasonably
effective assistance given the totality of the circumstances." Washington v.
Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1250 (5th Cir. 1982). See Mackenna v. Ellis, 280
F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960); Beasely v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th
Cir. 1974); Birt v. Montgomery, 709 F.2d 690, 700 (11th Cir 1983).
58. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See also, United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648
(1984), a companion case to Strickland which also raised the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
59. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. In Strickland, trial counsel conducted vir-
tually no investigation into the possibility of obtaining testimony from the de-
fendant's relatives, friends or former employers. He did not seek any psychiat-
ric or psychological evaluations of his client. Ultimately, he presented no
evidence at the penalty phase of the trial.
60. Id. at 707 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
61.
That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside
the accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional com-
mand. The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of
counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to
the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results. An ac-
cused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or
appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair
.... In giving meaning to the requirement [of effective assistance of
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versal of a capital conviction. The "performance" prong re-
quires a performance "so deficient and the errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as anticipated under the
Sixth Amendment."6 2 The Court evidenced a reluctance to
"second guess" defense counsel, and directed that review "in-
dulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assist-
ance."6 3 Furthermore, review should indulge a second pre-
sumption that "under the circumstances, the challenged ac-
tion 'might be considered sound trial strategy.' "64
The "performance prong" established an ambiguous stan-
dard deeming any "reasonable" performance by counsel con-
stitutionally sufficient. The presumption of "reasonable per-
formance" and deference of "sound trial strategy" has made it
almost impossible for an appeal based upon a claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel to prevail. Reviewing courts uphold
the performance of counsel when the court is able to attribute
any conceiveable strategy to the performance, even if there is
no evidence that the attorney pursued that particular
strategy.65
62. Id. at 687.
63. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). The Court stated
that "judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential....
A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight ... and to evaluate the conduct
from counsel's perspective at the time. Id.
64. Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). A few
years later in Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 186 (1985), the Supreme
Court reaffirmed its adherence to this presumption. In Strickland, the Court
stated:
[Sitrategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strate-
gic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable
precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgements sup-
port the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a
duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable deci-
sion that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffec-
tiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly
assessed for reasonableness in all circumstances, applying a heavy
measure of deference to counsel's judgments.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91 (emphasis added).
65. See e.g., Darden, 477 U.S. at 186. In this case, petitioner claimed inef-
fective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of the trial during which
counsel called no witnesses during the trial and relied on "a simple plea of
mercy" from the petitioner. Id. at 186. The Court in Darden stated "that there
are several reasons why counsel could have chosen to rely on a simple plea of
mercy". Id. at 186 (emphasis added). The Court then went on to discuss sev-
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A glaring hypocrisy in the logic of the Strickland decision
is the obvious truth that any deference to strategy is valid
only if counsel is competent and exercising an informed and
appropriate course of action. Given the state of representa-
tion in capital cases today,66 this may rarely be the case.
The "prejudice" prong mandates that any deficient per-
formance must also have prejudiced the defense.6 7 This re-
quires the defendant, on appeal, to show "a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
results of the proceedings would have been different."68 This
is widely seen as an even more difficult challenge to sur-
mount than the performance prong, and has been compared
to the proverbial "eye of the needle[,] through which few peti-
tioners will be able to pass."69
B. Effective Counsel in Capital Cases
In Strickland, the Court did not distinguish between a
trial involving a question of guilt, or one involving capital
sentencing. The Court maintained that for "purposes of
describing counsel's duties," a capital sentencing proceeding
"need not be distinguished from an ordinary trial."70 This
failure to establish a higher standard or more stringent re-
view for capital cases flew in the face of Furman and all of the
previous capital case jurisprudence establishing that "death
is different."7 1 Given that the quality of the defendant's coun-
eral possible strategies for this course of action, none of which, it appears, were
testified to by the trial counsel. Id.
66. See infra part 111.2.
67. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
68. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
69. Ivan K. Fong, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39
STAN. L. REv. 461, 481 (1986-87).
70. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
71. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972). The Court has reaffirmed
this view in numerous cases. In Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), the
Court noted that "[firom the point of view of the defendant, [death] is different
both in its severity and its finality. From the point of view of society, the action
of the sovereign in taking the life of one of its citizens also differs dramatically
from other legitimate state actions." Id. at 357.
In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, (1976), the Court stated:
The penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of im-
prisonment no matter how long. Death, in its finality differs more from
life imprisonment than a 100 year prison term differs from one of only
a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corre-
sponding need for reliability in the determination that death is the ap-
propriate punishment in a specific case.
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sel during capital trials may be all that separates those con-
demned to die and those permitted to live, this aspect of the
Strickland decision is as disturbing as its nearly insurmount-
able two-pronged test. Strickland has made it extremely dif-
ficult for capital sentences to be successfully appealed on the
basis of ineffective counsel-no matter how poor the perform-
ance of defense lawyers.
This difficulty is fundamentally troubling not only be-
cause "death is different" (since the sentence is irreversible
once carried out), but because capital defendants are primar-
ily indigent and represented by court-appointed lawyers
who, all too frequently, provide ineffective counsel.
Numerous studies have documented the dramatic need
to improve the quality of counsel appointed in capital cases.72
Of the 28 people on Kentucky death row at the beginning of
1989, seven had been represented at trial by attorneys who
have since been disbarred, or who have resigned rather than
face disbarment.73 Even when blatantly negligent conduct
occurs in front of judges, appointed defense lawyers have
been permitted to continue representing defendants. 74 For
example, In People v. Garrison, Garrison's counsel, an alco-
holic, was arrested en route to court and found to have a
blood alcohol level of .27!75 In Harrison v. Zant, defense
counsel was found to have slept through parts of the trial.76
Id. at 305.
In Pruett v. State, 574 So. 2d 1342 (Miss. 1990), Justice Anderson pointed
out that "every member of this [Supreme) Court has written or joined at least
one opinion endorsing the proposition that because of its irrevocability, the
death penalty is qualitatively different from any other punishment and hence
must be accompanied by unique standards." Id. at 1342 (Anderson, J.,
dissenting).
72. See e.g., A.B.A. & NAT. LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER Assoc., GIDEON UN-
DONE! THE CRISES OF INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING 3 (1982); Klein & Spangen-
berg, Indigent Defense Crisis, 1993 A.B.A SEC. CRIM. JUST. AD Hoc Comm. ON
THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS 5; ROBBINS, TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SYS-
TEM OF REVIEW IN STATE DEATH PENALTY CASES (1990) (ABA Recommendations
Concerning Death penalty Habeas Corpus and Related Materials from the ABA
Criminal Justice Section's Project on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus).
73. Ronald J. Tabak, The Execution of Injustice: A Cost and Lack.of-Benefit
Analysis of the Death Penalty, 23 Loy. L. REV. 59, 73-74 n.92 (1989).
74. House v. Balkcom, 725 F.2d 608, 612 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
870 (1984).
75. People v. Garrison, 254 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1986).
76. Harrison v. Zant, No. 880V-1640, Order at 2 (Super. Ct. Butts County,
Ga., Oct. 5, 1990), aff'd, 402 S.E.2d 518 (Ga. 1991) (Conviction affirmed where
defense counsel was found to have slept through parts of a capital trial).
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Judicial tolerance of incompetence is troubling, as is an occa-
sional preference for inexperienced counsel: one judge en-
tered an order specifically stating that an "inexperienced
lawyer" should be appointed to a case, rather than appointing
the lawyer from the Legal Defense Fund who had secured a
reversal for the client.7 v
I have argued that the capital defendant's constitutional
right to individualized sentencing imposes a duty on the part
of the defense counsel to investigate and present any miti-
gating evidence "to make the case for life." Many capital case
histories demonstrate trial counsel's dereliction of this duty.
When little or no mitigating evidence is presented during the
penalty trial, juries inevitably return death verdicts (indeed,
they have been given no reason to impose a more lenient sen-
tence). These decisions normally withstand an ineffective
assistance of counsel challenge due to the hurdles imposed by
Strickland. However, when some of these cases are reversed
for other reasons, and (competent) new counsel properly in-
vestigate and present mitigating evidence for a (new) penalty
trial, verdicts of life imprisonment or pleas to life sentences
are obtained.7 8
77. Victor V. Roberts had a capital trial that beat all speed records in the
"rush to judgment." Georgia v. Roberts (unpublished opinion N.D. Ga., 1992).
The crime occurred on February 1, 1984 and Mr. Roberts was on death row by
April 1 of the same year. Id. On appeal, the conviction and sentence of death
were reversed on several grounds and sent back for re-trial before the original
trial judge. Id. The court refused to appoint one of the lawyers who had se-
cured the appeal. Id.
78. In the following cases, mitigating evidence was not presented to the ju-
ries that returned sentences of death. When the cases were reversed on appeal,
new counsel gathered mitigating evidence and presented it to the prosecutor
and were able to secure pleas to life sentences.
In Holloway v. State, 361 S.E.2d 794 (Ga. 1987), during the first trial the
court denied any funds to allow for an expert to demonstrate the mental limita-
tions of the defendant. Id. at 796. On direct appeal, counsel secured an expert
and presented evidence that the defendant had an I.Q. of 49 and the intellec-
tual capacity of a seven year old. Id. The court reversed and a life plea was
entered based upon the evidence of the expert witness. Id.
In Smith v. Kemp, 664 F. Supp. 500 (M.D. Ga. 1987), counsel presented a
psychologist and a psychiatrist during post-conviction proceedings to demon-
strate the mental retardation of the defendant and his failure to understand his
Miranda warnings. Smith v. Kemp, 664 F. Supp. 500 (M.D. Ga. 1987) (setting
aside death sentence on other grounds), aff'd sub nom. Smith v. Zant, 887 F.2d
1407 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc). After the case was reversed, this information
led to a plea to a life sentence.
In Thomas v. Kemp, 796 F.2d 1322 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
996 (1986), two psychiatrists testified post-conviction to demonstrate that the
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Nathan Brown was arrested shortly after his eighteenth
birthday, and charged, along with two others, with murder-
ing a young boy during a robbery. Despite Brown's youth,
defendant was suffering from schizophrenia and was severely psychotic. Id. at
1324. After a reversal, according to Stephen B. Bright , counsel for Donny
Thomas, this information was the basis for a plea to a life sentence. Telephone
Interview with Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for Donny Thomas (July 1994).
In the following cases, the initial death sentence withstood the challenge
for ineffective assistance of counsel but was reversed on other grounds. New
counsel were able to secure a life verdict. These cases only reflect a sample of
the many scenarios in which this occurred.
See generally, Berryhill v. Zant, 858 F.2d 633 (11th Cir. 1988) (ineffective
assistance of counsel claims rejected, relief granted on jury challenge, in post-
conviction proceedings counsel used an expert to explain the jury selection is-
sue, counsel also presented numerous law witnesses in mitigation; this infor-
mation was available to the district attorney when a subsequent plea to life
was made and accepted); Bowen v. Kemp, 769 F.2d 672 (1985), modified, 832
F.2d 546 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied., 478 U.S. 1021 (1988) (ineffec-
tive assistance claim rejected, relief granted on instruction error, life sentence
imposed after retrial); Cervi v. Kemp, 855 F.2d 702, 705 n.7 (11th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1172 (1989) (ineffective assistance claim rejected, relief
granted on confession issue, subsequent plea to life); Corn v. Kemp, 837 F.2d
1474 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1023 (1988) (per curiam) (ineffective
assistance claim rejected, relief granted on instruction issue, subsequent plea to
life); Drake v. Francis, 727 F.2d 990 (11th Cir. 1984), vacated in part, 762 F.2d
1449 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986) (ineffective
assistance claim rejected, relief granted on instruction error, subsequent plea to
life); Franklin v. Francis, 720 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307
(1985) (ineffective assistance of counsel claim rejected, relief granted on instruc-
tion issue; life imposed by jury on retrial); Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487
(11th Cir. 1983) (ineffective assistance of counsel claim rejected, relief granted
on instruction issue, on retrial, jury verdict of "mercy," effectively life); Pruett v.
Thigpen, 805 F.2d 1032, 1037 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1033 (1987)
(summary affirmance of district court denial of ineffective assistance claim and
habeas relief on voir dire issue, at re-trial one expert was called in the guilt
phase, at the penalty phase, several mental health experts were used for assist-
ance in preparation and consultation on the case, numerous law witnesses were
brought in from all over the country to testify, life sentence imposed when jury
deadlocked on the question of punishment); Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d
1346, 1366-67 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982) (ineffective
assistance claim rejected, relief granted on instruction issue, subsequent plea to
life)
In all but Westbrook and Washington, the error redressed by reversal per-
tained to the first phase of the trial and cannot account for the change in the
outcome between life and death.
In Brooks v. Georgia, 716 F.2d 780 (11th Cir. 1983), Stephen Bright, coun-
sel for Mr. Brooks explained that there were three experts at re-trial who testi-
fied in the penalty phase: a psychologist, a sociologist, and an expert in prison
conditions and adjustment (other experts were used for consultation and prepa-
ration of the case). Telephone Interview with Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for
William Brooks, July 1994. Numerous law witnesses were brought in to testify
in mitigation. Id. The jury reached a life verdict. Id.
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lack of prior record, and limited role in the crime, his lawyer
presented no mitigating evidence and made no effort to plea
for imprisonment rather than the electric chair. Brown re-
ceived the death sentence.79
Eddie Ross, a black male, was represented at his murder
trial by a lawyer who had been the head of the local Klu Klux
Klan.80 The lawyer failed to present mitigating evidence dur-
ing Ross' penalty trial, and Ross received the death penalty.,'
Both sentences were reversed, Brown's because of his
lawyer's conflict of interest, and Ross' because of his lawyer's
ineffectiveness.8 2 In seperate post-conviction proceedings,
Brown and Ross were represented by the same lawyer, who
investigated, prepared, and presented extensive mitigating
evidence for each defendant. When the evidence was
presented to the prosecutor for each case, a life sentence plea
was obtained.
William Brooks was sentenced to death by a jury who
heard no evidence during his penalty trial. Although counsel
was not found to be ineffective, Mr. Brooks' case was reversed
and a new trial granted. During the second trial three ex-
perts testified. The psychologist and the psychiatrist ex-
plained many of the mental health issues to the jury.83 An
expert in prison conditions educated the jury about Mr.
Brooks' institutional adjustment and how he would spend his
years if permitted to live in prison.8 4 Numerous witnesses
from the community testified on behalf of Mr. Brooks and told
the jury of their experiences with him. The new jury re-
turned a life verdict.8 5
These cases highlight the obvious: quality representation
in capital cases can make the difference between life and
death. Brown, Ross, and Brooks are the fortunate ones, who
ultimately obtained decent representation and were able to
present their "case for life." Other defendants are executed
79. Brown v. State, 275 S.E.2d 52 (Ga. 1981).
80. Ross v. State, 326 S.E.2d 194 (Ga. 1985). Interview with Patsy Morris,
Georgia Resource Center (July 1994).
81. Ross, 326 S.E.2d at 194.
82. See Brown v. State, No. CV-188-027 (1989) (reversed due to attorney
conflict of interest for representing two co-defendants); see also Ross v. Kemp,
393 S.E.2d 244, 245 (Ga. 1990) (reversal for ineffectiveness of counsel).
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without ever receiving this opportunity, and therein lies the
real tragedy of our justice system.
Horace Dunkins was executed in Alabama in 1989. He
was mentally retarded, with an I.Q. below seventy, and did
not have the mental development of a twelve year old. His
jury was unaware of these facts at the time they sentenced
him to death. 6 When this information was reported in the
newspapers, one juror came forward and stated that if she
had known this information, she would not have voted for
death. 7 Dunkins died because of the ineffectiveness of his
defense counsel.
Diverse reasons account for the frequent ineffectiveness
and incompetence of capital defense counsel. These include
inexperience, insufficient training, and negligence. But at
the root of the problem is the failure of most states to estab-
lish standards and to provide resources that assure the ap-
pointment of competent counsel."" The bottom line, unfortu-
nately, is that capital defendants, who most critically deserve
exceptional representation, may be the very individuals least
likely to receive it. Moreover, relief on appeal is effectively
blocked by Strickland.
C. Summary
Despite the rhetoric of Strickland reaffirming the need
for competent counsel, the two-pronged test established by
the Court creates an almost insurmountable hurdle for crim-
inal defendants raising claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The principles of Gideon are still cited today, but the
promise of Gideon remains largely unfulfilled: many persons
charged with capital crimes are still denied the "guiding
hand" necessary to ensure a fair trial.
86. Peter Applebome, Executions of Retarded Men Set in the South Stir De-
bate, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1989, at A10.
87. Peter Applebome, Two Electric Volts in Alabama Execution, N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 1989, at A6. See Mitchell v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 1026 (1987). In Mitchell,
counsel made no attempt to investigate mitigating evidence which included wit-
nesses such as a city council member, a former prosecutor, a pro football player,
a bank vice-president and teachers. Id. at 1026-31 (Marshall, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari). See also Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080 (11th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1088 (1986). At the penalty phase in Messer, coun-
sel failed to present mitigating evidence of steady employment, military record,
church attendance, and co-operation with police. Id. at 1093-97 (Johnson, J.,
dissenting). Mitchell and Messer have been executed.





The sorry state of capital defense chronicled above arises
from judicial and legislative responses that ignore the special
needs of capital litigation. Beginning with Strickland, the ju-
diciary has failed to establish standards that will uphold a
capital defendant's constitutional right to individualized sen-
tencing. The Court should acknowledge the failure of Strick-
land and revise the test for evaluating the performance of
counsel in capital cases. The Supreme Court's reluctance to
revise Strickland may be understood as a hesitancy to burden
courts with wholesale reversals. However, the Court's failure
to act does not relieve the state legislatures from their obliga-
tion to adopt effective guidelines to insure competent legal
representation for capital defendants.
B. Inadequate Judicial Response
The Court in Strickland failed to explicitly provide a
higher standard of review in capital cases.8 9 Although the
language of Strickland provided the opportunity to review
penalty trials with a higher degree of scrutiny,90 such vigi-
lance has not been applied. The Court needs to reconsider its
test for evaluating effective assistance of counsel.
The Supreme Court must acknowledge the failure of
Strickland to ensure effective representation in capital cases,
and set up a new test for evaluating the performance of coun-
sel in penalty trials. The Court should create a "presumption
of ineffectiveness" when counsel fails to investigate the back-
89. This would have been consistent with earlier precedents requiring addi-
tional procedural safeguards in capital cases. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 914 (1983) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
90. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 704 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Brennan's concurring opinion suggested that the
flexible language in Strickland would allow special consideration of capital
cases by construing the phrase "reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms" to take into account whether the proceedings involve a sentence of
death. Id.
[The standards announced today can and should be applied with
concern for the special considerations that must attend review of coun-
sel's performance in a capital sentencing proceeding .... [We have
consistently required that capital proceedings be policed at all stages
by an especially vigilant concern for procedural fairness and for the
accuracy of factfinding.
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ground and life of the defendant in preparation of a penalty
trial. This presumption ensures adherence to the constitu-
tional requirement of "individualized sentencing" and recog-
nizes the practical necessity of making the "case for life"
before a penalty phase jury. The addition of this presumption
ensures that counsel's decision not to present mitigating evi-
dence is, indeed, a strategic one, as it will be based upon a
review of all possible mitigating evidence.
A higher standard of review for capital cases is consis-
tent with the Supereme Court's adherence to "death is differ-
ent," and the notion that additional procedural safeguards
are appropriate in capital cases.9 1
The Court's modification of the standard of review for the
performance of counsel would send a clear mandate to state
legislatures to provide the resources necessary for a full and
complete investigation of penalty phase trials. Without this
requirement from the Court, financially burdened states have
no motivation to replace existing systems with potentially
more expensive ones.
Realistically, the Court is unlikely to engage in modify-
ing any standard that could result in a wholesale reversal of
pending cases. 92 If any reform is to take place, we must look
to the state and federal legislatures who can implement stan-
dards for the appointment of counsel that would be applied
prospectively.
C. Inadequate State Legislative Response
Most state legislatures have failed both to establish stan-
dards for the appointment of competent capital counsel, and
to provide adequate resources for capital defense. State ac-
tion in both of these areas is essential to ensure effective
representation.
91. Gregg, 428 U.S. 153; Barefoot, 463 U.S. 880.
92. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). In McClesky, the Court ac-
knowledged the statistical evidence indicates a discrepancy that appears to cor-
relate with race. Id. at 3122. The Court declined to reverse on that basis and
expressed its concern that such a ruling, "taken to its logical conclusion[, would
have] thrown into serious question the principles that underlie our entire crimi-
nal justice system". Id. at 314-15.
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1. Failure To Establish Guidelines
Standards for the appointment of counsel in capital cases
rarely exist.93 It is not unusual in capital cases to have de-
fense lawyers with little or no capital case experience.94
The appointment of competent trial counsel is critical to
maintaining a death penalty system which passes constitu-
tional muster; it is the only means to ensure fairness in the
procedure and reliability in the result. Experienced counsel
would identify and litigate critical legal issues as they arise,
allowing most issues to be resolved at trial. At the same
time, skilled counsel could ensure that crucial constitutional
claims are preserved for review on appeal.95
93. In California, the State Bar of California recommended that standards
be adopted for the appointment of counsel in capital cases. The California
Supreme Court has declined to adopt this recommendation as a Rule of Court.
Public Letter from the California Supreme Court Committee (Spring 1994) (on
file with author).
94. See e.g., Paradis v. Arave, 954 F.2d 1483, 1490-91 (9th Cir. 1992) (de-
fendant represented by lawyer who passed the bar six months earlier, had tried
no criminal cases and had not taken any courses in criminal law, criminal pro-
cedure or trial advocacy in law school); Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741, 743 (11th
Cir. 1985) (defendant represented by lawyer who had been admitted to the bar
just a few months earlier); Bell v. Watkins, 692 F.2d 999, 1008, (5th Cir. 1982)
(defendant represented by lawyer who had recently graduated from law school
and had never tried a criminal case to verdict).
95. Prior to 1977, a defendant was permitted to raise valid constitutional
claims in federal courts unless he had "deliberately bypassed" those claims in
state court. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963). A defendant "deliberately
bypassed a claim if he "understandingly and knowingly" decided to forego a
claim for tactical or strategic reasons. Id. at 439. In 1977, the Court held in
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), that a defendant has waived his right
to any claim unless he can show "cause" for not having raised them earlier and
"prejudice" resulting from this failure. Id. at 87. The result is that when trial
counsel fails to object to certain procedures or to raise certain claims, a defend-
ant may be barred from raising these same issues later, even when this failure
occurs due to ignorance, inadvertence, or mistake.
There are numerous examples of persons who have meritorious claims
that the courts will not address because of a failure of earlier counsel to raise
these claims. Many of these persons have been executed.
Aubrey Adams was executed on May 4, 1989. Prior to his execution, the
11th Circuit had unanimously held that his death sentence was unconstitu-
tional. Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526, 1528 (1989). The U.S. Supreme
Court held by a 5-4 vote that the 11th Circuit should not have considered this
claim because no objection was raised at trial and no "cause" for this failure to
object was found. Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401 (1989).
John Eldon Smith was tried with his wife before a jury that was later
found to have been unconstitutional because blacks and women had been sys-
tematically excluded. His wife, whose attorney had preserved her objection,
was retried and was given a life sentence. Machetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 236
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The time has come to acknowledge the gross inadequacy
of representation in capital cases, and for state legislatures,
bar committees or state courts to mandate minimum require-
ments for counsel in capital cases.
2. Proposed Guidelines for the Appointment of Counsel
In adopting minimum standards for counsel in capital
cases, it is critical that requirements are not defined solely
by an objective system based upon years of practice or prior
experience with capital trials. This type of system will allow
lawyers who have previously handled capital cases ineptly to
continue to qualify for appointment. 96 In order to ensure rep-
resentation by competent counsel, the standards must in
some way reflect counsel's actual ability to handle complex
litigation.97 The American Bar Association Task Force on
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus suggested advocacy require-
ments as follows:
a. Training in trial advocacy such as completion of one of
the two week sessions offered by the National College of
Criminal Defense or the National Institute of Trial
Advocacy,98
(11th Cir. 1982). Mr. Smith was found to have waived the claim and he was
executed. Smith v. Kemp, 715 F. 2d 1459 (11th Cir. 1983).
John Young was executed on March 20, 1985. His lawyer admitted to being
on drugs at the time of the trial. Young v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 514, 518 (11th Cir
1985). The court refused to hear his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
holding that it was raised too late.
Ivan Ray Stanley was executed on July 12, 1984 after the court refused to
hear his claim of improper jury instruction given at trial. Stanley v. Kemp, 737
F. 2d 921, 922 (11th Cir. 1984). His codefendant, Joseph Thomas, was granted
a retrial when his lawyers raised the same claim in a timely fashion. Thomas v.
Kemp, 800 F.2d 1024 (11th Cir. 1956).
96. See supra note 79.
97. The American Bar Association discussed this issue stating:
Standards [for counsel in capital cases] should also require skills in
managing complex litigation and negotiations, demonstrated ability in
the directions of investigations of guilt and mitigation, knowledge and
experience in dealing with mental health issues, writing and analytical
skills as evidenced in previously written briefs and memoranda, and
trial advocacy skills.
ROBBINS, supra note 73, at Minority Rep. app. A-20.
98. There are very few programs that provide advocacy training that is di-
rected specifically to the defense of a capital case. The only two that presently
recruit and admit lawyers from around the country are the Bryan R.
Shechmeister Death Penalty College at Santa Clara University Law School and




b. After completion of such a program, six to twelve
hours of continuing legal education each year in areas re-
lated to trial advocacy and the defense of criminal cases;
c. At least five years of providing competent representa-
tion in civil or criminal cases; that is representation in
which the attorney filed case specific motions and memo-
randa supported by the applicable law, not "boilerplates",
conducted full investigations, litigated pre-trial motions,
examined witnesses, gave opening statements and closing
arguments, submitted proposed jury instructions and sub-
mitted letters of memoranda to the court regarding
sentencing. 99
Further, an organization or agency should be established
to enforce these guidelines, provide training, and assist in
obtaining support services. The organization should be run
by a director who answers only to an independent board.
Judges should have no role in setting up and implementing
the internal guidelines of this office or in the decisions con-
cerning the competence of counsel; their involvement in a
purely "defense function" would create a conflict of interest.
D. Failure To Provide Adequate Resources
"PLEASE HELP - DESPERATE" This extreme notice
was posted in a courthouse in Kentucky by a Judge trying to
appoint a lawyer to a capital case. The lawyer who finally
took the case had no active practice and no previous capital
litigation experience. Not surprisingly, the defendant in the
case was convicted and sentenced to death.10 0
The difficulty of finding competent lawyers willing to
take capital cases is one of the fundamental problems of the
present capital justice system. Lawyers are unwilling to un-
dertake capital representation due to low pay, high cost (of
unfunded services), and severe emotional toll. 1 1
Numerous studies have reviewed and documented the
disparity between the legal representation available to those
99. See ROBBINS, supra note 73, at app. A-20 n.33.
100. Klein, supra note 73, at 5 n.16.
101. Pruett v. State, 574 So. 2d 1342, 1350 (Miss. 1990) (Anderson, J., dis-
senting). Citing a death penalty questionnaire, the judge observed that
"[blecause of the extreme financial hardship that capital proceedings bring with
it, 82% of trial counsel who have represented indigent defendants in a capital
murder case would either not accept another case or would be very reluctant to
do so. Id.
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with money, and the representation provided to those with
none. 10 2 Court opinions have discussed the impact of funding
on the quality of legal services provided to indigent defend-
ants.10 3 In capital cases, the impact of this disparity becomes
much more serious, both because of the life and death nature
of the trial, and the high cost of preparing an adequate de-
fense.1 0 4 A report prepared for the American Bar Association
concluded that "[ilnsufficient compensation [for defense coun-
sel] has its most profound consequences in capital cases....
[Ilt is difficult to attract experienced counsel to or provide
necessary training for capital cases when the total dollars
available are so minimal."10 5
In return for the complex task of building a death pen-
alty defense, appointed defense counsel typically will receive
an hourly wage or a fixed rate that is less than the rate for
comparable non-criminal cases and, in some states, less than
the minimum wage. 10 6 A recent study in Virginia concluded
that after taking into account the attorney's overhead ex-
102. See generally Paduano and Smith, The Uneonscionability of Sub-Mini-
mum Wages Paid Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 281,
334 n.209 (1991) (listing several articles and studies on relationship between
funding and counsel).
103. White v. Board of Comm'rs, 537 So. 2d 1376, 1380 (Fla. 1989) "The
relationship between an attorney's compensation and the quality of his or her
representation cannot be ignored." Id.
The Florida Supreme Court stated that "[t]he link between compensation
and the quality of representation remains too clear." Makemson v. Martin
County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1114 (Fla. 1986) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987).
104. For example, the Wall Street firm of Cahill, Gordon and Reindel (litigat-
ing pro bono) incurred $1,700,000 in attorneys fees and expenses in successfully
challenging the death sentence of a Mississippi inmate. Frank Judge, Death
Row Defense, Wall Street Style, Am. LAw., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 35. In another
case, the Wall Street firm of Sullivan and Cromwell (also litigating pro bono)
incurred $1,600,000 in attorneys' fees and more than 10,000 billable hours dur-
ing a three year period in winning a new penalty phase based upon original
counsel's ineffectiveness, and then securing a life sentence before a new jury.
Daniel Wise, Sullivan Effort Spares the Life of Ex-Marine, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 27,
1989, at 1.
105. See Klein, supra note 73, at 7.
106. Id. at app. A-21 n.37. It was discovered in Boone County, Georgia, that
the person who fixed the air conditioner in the court house was paid more per
hour than any lawyer had ever been paid to defend an indigent person in that
county.
In Pruett v. State of Mississippi, 574 So. 2d 1342, Judge Anderson pointed
out that the court reporter in the capital trial was paid "far more" than defense
counsel in the case. Pruett v. Mississippi, 574 So. 2d 1342, 1349 (Anderson, J.,
dissenting) (challenging the constitutionality of the statutory fee cap of
$1000.00 as compensation for counsel in a capital case).
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penses, the effective hourly rate paid to Virginia counsel rep-
resenting indigent capital defendants was $13.19.1°7
Some systems place a "cap" on the total fees that can be
paid to defense counsel for any one case. This structure is
clearly incompatible with the demands of capital litigation
and the complexity of capital cases. In some states this cap is
as low as $1000.l1B In one Mississippi case, the $1000 maxi-
mum fee paid to each of the attorneys represented $2.22 for
one attorney and $2.07 for the other.10 9 In Kentucky, the
maximum pay for a capital case was $1,250, which included
counsel's pretrial preparation as well as the trial itself.110
The complexity and extensive resource requirements in-
herent in competent capital defense efforts means that capi-
tal cases rarely receive sufficient funds. Not only does ap-
pointed defense counsel earn next to nothing, counsel also
often ends up paying for ancillary efforts. A recent study in
Texas found the average out of pocket amount spent by de-
fense counsel handling post-conviction cases to be as high as
$15,627.111
In order to ensure competent representation in capital
cases, it is not enough to appoint experienced and highly
skilled counsel. The system must also provide for appropri-
ate pay to counsel for the time spent in preparing the case
107. Klein, supra note 73, at 7.
108. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-15-17 (Supp. 1994) (setting $1000 maxi-
mum for out of court time); ALA. CODE § 15-12-21 (1994) (same).
Other states set a maximum cap while allowing the court discretion to in-
crease the amount. This, however, rarely occurs. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch.
925.036 (1994) (setting a maximum amount of $3500); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-
61 (Michie 1994) (setting a maximum on appeal of $500 for all costs); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 7.125 (Michie 1993) (setting a $12,000 limit).
109. Pruett v. Mississippi, 574 So. 2d 1342, 1348 n.7 (1990).
110. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31.170 (Baldwin 1994). The court, however, may
find that special circumstances exist to warrant a higher fee. Id.
111. Klein, supra note 73, at 7.
In Pruett, the court acknowledged the financial hardship of capital cases in
an underfunded system and observed that,
[o]ther members of the Mississippi bar who participate on capital pro-
ceedings are rewarded with imminent financial ruin .... In Missis-
sippi, for example, a lawyer paid $25.36 per hour in overhead in
1988.... Therefore, counsel [under our pay scheme] may well have
lost over $23 for every hour worked on the case."
Pruett, 574 So. 2d at 1350. The judge went on to observe that in response to a
questionnaire it was noted that because of the financial hardship of capital
cases, 82% of trial counsel who have previously been appointed to a capital case
would either not accept another appointed case or would be very reluctant to do
so. Id.
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and must provide funding for those ancillary services neces-
sary for effective representation.
All of the procedural rights and protections afforded to
capital defendants have no meaning if counsel is denied real
access to necessary funding. A defendant's constitutional
right to present mitigating evidence is a hollow right if the
defense is denied money to obtain witnesses or experts to
fully investigate and present evidence on a defendant's
behalf.
The inexperience and resource-poor defense of the indi-
gent capital defendant is in marked contrast to the exper-
ienced and resource-rich team of the prosecution. As a com-
plicated crime of tax or securities law violation would
inevitably have a specialist conducting any investigation and
trial, so too, a capital criminal case inevitably attracts an ex-
perienced criminal prosecutor with capital case specializa-
tion. While a district attorney does not have unlimited re-
sources, they are vast in comparison to those of the indigent
defendant.
The district attorney need not measure the amount of
time spent on a particular case to determine if it is financially
viable. Government counsel receive regular salaries through-
out a capital trial; they don't have to worry about paying of-
fice overhead expenses, as does the defense. The prosecution
can employ the investigative resources of numerous agencies,
without consideration of out-of-pocket payments. One capi-
tal case can involve one or more homicide detectives working
full time, in addition to the help of various departmental ex-
perts in the areas of mental health, forensics, ballistics, hair
and fiber, serology, fingerprints, and even DNA analysis. The
prosecution can also seek help from the vast resources of fed-
eral agencies such as the FBI, DEA, and ATF.
1 12
112. Bright, supra note 12, at 1844-1845.
Many death penalty states have two state funded offices that spe-
cialize in handling serious criminal cases. Both employ attorneys who
generally spend years-some even their entire careers-handling
criminal cases. Both pay decent annual salaries and provide health
care and retirement benefits. Both send their employees to confer-
ences and continuing legal education programs each year to keep them
up to date on the latest developments in the law. Both have at their
disposal a stable of investigative agencies, a wide range of experts, and
mental health professionals anxious to help develop and interpret facts
favorable to their side. Unfortunately, however, in many states both
[Vol. 35514
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For attorneys who are willing to take on an indigent capi-
tal client, the financial hardship will constantly affect how a
case is prepared and how much time counsel can afford to
spend on the case.113 The proper development of mitigating
evidence and presentation of the "case for life" is time con-
suming, resource intensive, and specialized.' 14
There can be little dispute that inadequate funding im-
pedes the proper investigation and preparation of capital
cases. A report prepared for the American Bar Association by
the Spangenberg group studied the impact of inadequate
funding on assigned counsel programs and concluded that the
result of the present system was "ineffective lawyering."115
California has recognized the constitutional necessity of
providing adequate funding in capital cases. They have im-
plemented a system that, for the most part, provides reason-
able pay for lawyers as well as funding for ancillary services
"reasonably necessary" to the preparation of the defense.1 1 6
In 1976, after the existing death penalty statute was de-
clared unconstitutional, the California Legislature began con-
sideration of a new death penalty bill. 11 7 The bill had no pro-
of these offices are on the same side: the prosecution. One is the Dis-
trict Attorney's office....
The other office is the Attorney General's office....
In Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and many
other states with a unique fondness for capital punishment, there is no
similar degree of specialization or resources on the other side of capital
cases.
Id.
113. A low hourly rate is a disincentive to the lawyer to commit large
amounts of time to the capital case when the lawyer can make more money per
hour conducting other business. If there is a low statutory cap placed on the
fee, the disincentive is even greater because for every hour of work the hourly
fee decreases. See generally McLaughlin v. Royster, 346 F. Supp. 297, 300 (E.D.
Va. 1972) (court appointed counsel admitted that if he had been better paid he
would have "proceeded in the case differently" and interviewed more people);
State v. Pelfrey, 256 S.E.2d 438, 440 (W. Va. 1979) (court appointed counsel
admitted that he refused to seek a mistrial even though he believed it was fully
justified because he did not want to try the case again due to unsatisfactory
compensation).
114. Telephone Interview with Stephen B. Bright, Director, Southern Center
for Human Rights, and defense counsel in numerous capital cases (July 1994).
115. Klein, supra note 73, at 6.
116. Using California as an example is not to suggest that their system is
one without problems. The hourly rate of pay in several counties is often still
under the rate of pay for a lawyer of that level of skill and experience. Some
counties are now moving toward a "cap" on the total fee to be paid for a capital
case.
117. Penal Code Section 190 provided as follows:
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vision for funding ancillary services for capital defense,11 but
a "funding bill"119 was subsequently introduced which pro-
vided "for payment of investigators, experts and others in the
preparation or presentation" of the defense of indigent de-
fendants in capital cases.1 20 This mandate for funds for ex-
perts and services was considered essential in order to ensure
both the constitutionality of the new death penalty law as
well as the effective representation of indigent persons
charged with the death penalty.1 2 1 The funding bill was
Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer
death, if any one or more of the special circumstances enumerated in
Section 190.2 have been charged and found to be true in the manner
provided in Section 190.1. Every person otherwise guilty of murder in
the first degree shall suffer confinement in the state prison for life.
Every person guilty of murder in the second degree is punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison from five years to life.
Id.
In Rockwell v. Super. Ct. of Ventura County, 556 P.2d 1101 (1976), the
California Supreme Court concluded:
Because [California Penal Code] sections 190 through 190.3 make
death a mandatory punishment for those categories of first degree
murder encompassed by the special circumstances enumerated in sec-
tion 190.2, without provision for consideration of evidence of mitigating
circumstances as to the offense or in the personal characteristics of the
defendant, and afford no specific detailed guidelines as to the relevance
of such evidence in determining whether death is an appropriate pun-
ishment, they permit arbitrary imposition of the death penalty in vio-
lation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.
Id.
118. Existing law allowed counties to elect to pay for investigative services
and some expert witnesses generally of a psychiatric nature.
119. AB 938, CAPITAL CASES: INVESTIGATION FUNDS (introduced September,
1977).
120. Enrolled Bill Report from Department of Finance (Sept. 16, 1977).
Under analysis of the bill, the report states that "[tihis bill would provide that
the defendant in a capital case may, in addition, apply to the court for payment
of investigators, experts and others in the preparation or presentation of his
defense." Enrolled Bill Memorandum to Governor (Sept. 23, 1977); ANALYSIS OF
ASSEMBLY BILL No. 938, (Aug. 19, 1977); Keenan v. Super. Ct. of San Francisco,
640 P.2d 108 (Cal. 1982).
121. In a letter to Governor Edmund G. Brown, Assemblyman Goggin, the
author of the bill, summarized the rationale for the funding bill as follows:
The state currently provides an attorney for those accused of serious
crimes who cannot afford one. However, adequate representation of a
criminal defendant is often ineffective without the supporting services
provided for in AB 938. These resources are usually available to police
departments and prosecutors. If we are to have a death penalty, it is
especially important that indigent defendants, against whom this
sanction has been disproportionately applied in the past, have access
to that which those who retain private counsel are able to afford.
(Vol. 35516
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passed with an "urgency" clause after the new death penalty
law was already in effect.122
Other state legislatures should follow the lead of the Cal-
ifornia legislature, and recognize that adequate pay for coun-
sel and funding for ancillary services and experts is constitu-
tionally required in any death penalty scheme.
E. Summary
Experience shows that there is a general unavailability
of competent trial counsel for the representation of indigent
persons charged with a capital crime. The pervasive stan-
dard of low fees and inadequate funding for these cases dis-
courages most lawyers from attempting to undertake death
penalty representation. By paying lawyers reasonable fees
for the time spent in the preparation and presentation of cap-
Letter from Terry Goggin, California Assemblyman, to Edmund G. Brown, Gov-
ernor, California (Sept. 13, 1977) (on file at California State archives).
When the Senate Committee on the Judiciary prepared an analysis of the
bill, the stated of the funding bill was to "allow for a non-discriminatory appli-
cation of a death penalty statute against indigent defendants" (Sen. Comm. on
Judiciary of Cal. for AB 938, Background Information form (on file at California
State archives)) and to "increase the chances of a fair trial for an indigent de-
fendant in a capital case" (Senate Committee on Judiciary of California, 1977-
1978 Regular Session on AB 938).
122. The provision for an "urgency clause" is provided in the California Con-
stitution which states:
Urgency statutes are those necessary for immediate preservation of
the public peace, health, or safety. A statement of facts constituting
the necessity shall be set forth in one section of the bill. In each house
the section and the bill shall be passed separately, each by rollcall vote
entered in the journal, two thirds of the membership concurring.
CAL. CONST. art. WV, § 8, cl. d. The urgency clause in the funding bill stated:
The California Supreme Court has declared the existing death penalty
law unconstitutional. This act remedies one aspect of the constitu-
tional infirmities found to be in the existing law, and in order to guar-
antee the public the protection inherent in an operative death penalty
law, it is necessary that this act take effect immediately.
1977 Cal. Stat., ch. 1048 § 4 (an act to add § 987.9 to the California Penal Code).
The funding bill was codified as California Penal Code § 987.9 (1977).
In the trial of a capital case the indigent defendant, through his coun-
sel, may request the court for funds for the specific payment of investi-
gators, experts, and others for the preparation or presentation of the
defense. The application for such funds... shall specify that the funds
are reasonably necessary for the preparation or presentation of the de-
fense .... In making such a ruling [on the reasonableness of the re-
quest for funds], the court shall be guided by the need to provide a
complete and full defense for the defendant.
1977 Cal. Stat., ch. 1048 § 1 at 3178-79 (1977).
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ital cases, the states will be better able to attract competent
and skilled counsel.
V. CONCLUSION
We can no longer look to the courts to make the ideal of
Gideon a reality. The standards set to evaluate the perform-
ance of counsel in capital cases has done little, if anything, to
provide the "guiding hand of counsel" and to ensure that the
results are fair and reliable. The Supreme Court under the
direction of Chief Justice Rhenquist has abandoned the
plight of the indigent defendant and has led the call to sure
and swift executions. 123 If we cannot protect those against
whom the death penalty is most frequently sought, then we
"no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death."' 24
123. David G. Savage, Supreme Court Limits Death Row Appeals, L.A.
TIMES, April 7, 1991, at Al.
124. Calins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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